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ABSTRACT: The Telecommunications industry is usually characterised by low marginal 
costs and significant fixed costs which are the conditions for the inefficiency of marginal cost 
pricing. In such cases theory postulates that optimal pricing is obtained by maximising 
welfare subject to a restriction of viability of the firm: the second-best pricing scheme. The 
possible Welfare Losses due to second-best pricing varies according to the values of 
marginal costs, prices and demand elasticities. In this paper we intend to analyse to what 
extent the second-best pricing has been achieved in the Portuguese Telecommunications 
firm CTT, over the period 1950-1984 as well as the magnitude of the price-cost margins and 
Welfare Losses created. We obtained empirical evidence of the presence of economies of 
scale, a Welfare Loss estimate of  1% of the Telecommunications receipts and a result that 
price was 40% greater than marginal cost. We concluded that price regulation and public 
ownership of the firm did not seriously affect social welfare over the sample period (it should 
be noted that it is the non-digital and fixed-wire infrastructure period). Therefore, it is 
important to study the impact of new digital and non-wire technologies and new services 
provided in the old regulatory scenery. 
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1. Introduction  
Over the past decade many changes have occurred in the 
telecommunications industry all over the world. These changes led several 
authors to investigate the issue of telecommunications regulatory reform with 
particular emphasis on the question of why should government interfere and 
in what conditions. The economic literature, as surveyed by Braeutigam 
(1989), points out two conditions that justify regulatory intervention in an 
industry: the existence of a natural monopoly and an important Social 
Welfare Loss due to “second-best” pricing.  
An industry is considered a natural monopoly if in any relevant range 
of the output, a single firm in the market achieves a lower unit cost of 
production than two or more competitors (Baumol, 1982). In such a case 
competition leads to an inefficient production structure, because prices are 
set higher and less demand is satisfied. Given its relatively small marginal 
costs and important positive fixed costs, significant economies of scale are 
present in the telecommunications industry.  
If the firm must charge a uniform tariff and the net economic benefit is 
measured by the sum of producer plus consumer surplus, economic theory 
states that optimal price is achieved when the service is provided to all 
customers who are willing to pay at least as much as the marginal cost of 
production. However, in the natural monopoly case this would entail a 
negative level of profits. The solution to the welfare maximisation question, 
subject to a viability constraint, leads to the “second-best” pricing1 solution. 
At this price level there is a “dead-weight loss” which can be measured by 
the sum of the variations in the consumer and producer surpluses. Willig 
(1976) has studied the robustness of this measure to the underlying 
assumptions2 and found it to be quite reliable. Notwithstanding the recent 
contributions of Aiginger and Pfaffermayr (1997) this has become the 
established method to measure the Welfare Loss of a monopoly.  
It is this study’s intention to analyse the extent to which this second-
best pricing has been achieved in the Portuguese telecommunications 
industry for the period of 1950-1984. To accomplish this aim information on 
the largest Portuguese telecommunications enterprise is used3.  
Cabral (1990) studied a related but different issue. He estimated the 
optimal pricing for the Portuguese telephone service, that is, the price 
structure that maximises an “adjusted Social Welfare” function4. Other 
authors like Ng and Weisser (1974), Feldestein (1972) and Schmalansee 
(1981) developed their work finding optimal second-best pricing schemes 
using a methodology similar to that Cabral adopted. The methodology used 
here differs from Cabral’s model in several aspects. First, specifically the 
technology of the firm is studied by estimating a Translog cost function. 
Second, the usage charge is utilized instead of the two-part tariff, as in Gabel 
and Kennet (1993). Finally, in the Social Welfare function consumer and 
producer surpluses with equal weights are included, and distribution effects 
are not taken into account5. 
 The methodology adopted here follows that used by Braeutigam 
(1989) to decide when to regulate a natural monopoly. The paper is 
organised as follows: Section 2 presents the model used to estimate the 
price-cost margins and the Welfare Loss in the Portuguese 
telecommunications industry. Section 3 describes the data and estimation 
procedures used. Section 4 presents the empirical results obtained. Finally, 
section 5 concludes with a discussion of the findings and their significance to 
the Portuguese Telecommunications deregulation issue. 
  
2. Methodological Issues 
Marginal costs, prices and elasticity of demand influence the possible 
Welfare Loss. As some recent studies did (Kim, 1995) this study begins by 
obtaining a marginal cost measure using the estimation of a Translog Cost 
Function, which is a very flexible function because it is obtained as a second 
order approximation to any cost function. The Translog Cost Function that 
we used has one variable for output6 and three variables as inputs: capital, 
materials and labour and one variable for the technical progress.  
Once the symmetry and homogeneity restrictions are imposed 
(Greene, 1997)7 this function can be written as: 
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with the following share equations: 
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where t is the technical progress; Y* is the “Box-Cox”8 transformation of the 
output variable, pi is the price of factor i, si is the share of factor i on total 
costs TC, with i representing labour (i=1), capital (i=2) or materials (i=3).  
 From the Translog function, the cost elasticity of output is derived: 
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which evaluated at the “expansion point”9 takes the following form: 
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Scale economies can be calculated as the inverse of a1, and marginal 
costs as, 
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 Finally, the Welfare Loss can be measured by the “dead-weight loss 
triangle” given by the equation10: 
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  where ε is the price elasticity of telecommunication services. 
 
3. Data and Estimation Procedures. 
The methodology followed here, in relation to the Portuguese 
telecommunications industry, is subject to an important limitation. We know 
that the telecommunications system offers a wide range of services such as 
the connection and use of telephone lines, private circuits rental, leased 
lines, transmission capacity, telex, and others. However, the available 
Portuguese data are very poor, forcing us to use a single measure of output, 
namely the real service receipts. 
 This study opted to work with data spanning from 1950 to 1984 since 
after the mid-eighties digital technology was introduced in the Portuguese 
Telecommunications infrastructures. This technology has led to substantial 
changes in the cost structure of industry. Moreover, in the mid 1980s, with 
the advent of the information society many new products were introduced 
(mobile phones, fax) which could have changed demand conditions 
considerably. 
The capital measure was built using the investment, the capital stock, 
the depreciation and the price of investment. The price of capital is the ratio 
of capital expenditures and the stock of capital. The labour variable is 
approximated by a measure of the number of working hours and the price of 
labour is the ratio of labour expenditures and the number of working hours. 
Materials are the material expenditures and their price is an index of the 
most important materials consumed. Technical progress values are the 
percentage, at the local loop, of the automatic telephone stations. 
 The translog function and the two share equations were jointly 
estimated as Seemingly Unrelated Regression equations (SURE)11. To 
prevent the singularity of the variance-covariance matrix we deleted the 
materials share equation. The maximum likelihood parameter estimates 
obtained are the result of the iterative Zellner12 efficient estimation method. 
This method is more efficient than OLS the greater is the correlation between 
the disturbance terms from different equations and the lesser is the 
correlation between dependent variables. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 The results for the estimation of the Translog cost function are shown 
in Table I. In general all parameter estimates have the expected sign and 
statistical tests seem to ensure that variables are statiscally significant.  
 
[ INSERT TABLE I ] 
 
Following the methodology presented in Section II, we present in 
Table II some estimates based on the translog Cost function. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE I I ] 
 
The estimated value for the scale economies at the approximation 
point 1.84, is very close to what Kiss et al. (1983) estimated for Bell Canada 
(1.75) and well within the range of values found by other authors for 
telecommunications enterprises in the United States and Canada (1.42 to 
2.28) as surveyed by Kiss et al. (1987). 
To determine the Welfare Loss, the published price elasticities 
estimated by Pereira (1991) for the period 1968-1988 were used. It was 
assumed that these results are also valid for a longer period. The usage 
price elasticities selected ranged from –0.064 to –0.159613. The results show 
a Welfare Loss ranging from 0.0972% to 0.6042%, according to the value 
used for the demand elasticity. This is, as Brauetigam (1989) put it, a “very 
tolerable” loss. 
 Despite the small Welfare Loss, it seems that prices are set in a way 
that takes into account the survival of the firm. The estimated cost margin for 
this period is 40.631%, close to Rohlf’s (1979) estimate of 50% for local 
services. The results also suggest that prices are set close to the second-
best solution estimated by Cabral (1990) (price-cost of access margin of 
100% and price-cost of use margin of 25%).  
 
5. Conclusion  
 As Seabra (1993) and others, this study found some evidence that the 
market for Portuguese telecommunications was a natural monopoly. Our 
estimates are a rough approximation to the subadditivity issue, because a 
single variable was used as output and the telecommunications market is 
greatly represented by multi-product firms. Nevertheless we can conclude 
that the production of telephone service with the fixed-wire technology, over 
this period, 1950-1984, exhibits a strong level of scale economies. And this is 
the sufficient condition for the existence of a single output natural monopoly. 
The main issue in this paper was not the existence of a natural 
monopoly but the estimate of the relative magnitude of the welfare loss due 
to the price behaviour of the telecommunications firm studied. Thus, a 
positive analysis of the welfare implications of the specific regulatory 
environment was followed, prevailing on the Portuguese telecommunications 
market. The Portuguese telecommunications firm was publicly owned. A 
positive profit of the firm could be assumed as a substitute to government 
taxation14. The price-cost margin estimate obtained was not significantly 
different from second-best optimal estimates. The welfare loss generated 
seemed to be very “tolerable”. 
The main result seems to be that the price regulation and the public 
ownership of this Portuguese telecommunications firm did not seriously 
affect social welfare over our sample period.  
It should finally be noted that the analysis of this paper refers to the 
non-digital technology period and our conclusions must be indubitably 
associated with this. Therefore, an important task for further work is to study 
the impact of new digital and non-wire technologies and new services 
provided on the old regulatory environment. 
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1 These are combinations of price and quantities of the good that enable the viability of the firm and 
are Pareto superior to any others. This concept was initially applied by Boiteux (1956) to the problem 
of choosing optimal taxes subject to a constraint on tax receipts. Later on, Baumol and Bradford 
(1970) extended it to the problem of choosing optimal prices subject to a budget constraint.  
2 His methodology uses a Marshallian demand function constructed with observations on prices and 
quantities demanded by consumers. With this type of demand function consumer surplus is well 
measured if income effects are not very significant. 
3 Until recently phone services in Portugal were provided by three companies: Marconi, CTT, and 
TLP. Marconi had the monopoly for international calls outside of Europe, TLP had the market for the 
two major cities of Lisbon and Porto and finally CTT, the largest company , covered the rest. 
4 Cabral’s model derived efficiency and distribution optimal conditions for the telecommunications 
pricing. The Social Welfare function to be optimazed included distribution parameters. 
5 We assume that when we are analysing one market in particular, the transfer of income (utility) from 
consumers to producers is neutral. 
6 We know that  the Telecommunications system offers a wide range of services: connection and use 
of telephone lines, private circuits rental, leased lines, transmission capacity, telex, and others. 
However, since data was not available, we were compelled to use a single measure of output, namely 
the real services receipts. 
7  See Greene, chapter 15 for details. 
8  Y*=(Yλ-1)/λ if λ≠0 or Y*=logY if λ=0 
9 See Kiss et al (1987) pag.318 for details. 
10 See Morris and Hay (1991),  pag 581-2. 
11 It consists of a series of endogenous variables which are considered as a group because they bear a 
close relationship to each other. There is a relationship between the share equations, their sum is 
equal to one. In such a case the sum of the disturbances must be zero and ordinary least-squares 
estimation is not proper. 
12 The results of the iterative Zellner’s technique are maximum likelihood estimates when the 
variance-covariance matrix converges. 
13 As Gabel et al (1993) did, we assume that access charges are subsumed into the usage charges. 
14 As explained by Cabral (1990) 
 TABLE I-Parameter estimates for the Translog Cost Function 
Parameter Estimate T-Statistic 
CONSTANT (a) -0,026507  -1,15951 
CAPITAL (b1) 0,615483* 33,7541 
LABOUR  (b2) 0,281289* 17,2066 
MATERIALS (b3) 0,103228* 13,9005 
TECHNICAL PROGRESS  (d1) -1,05368* -4,68522 
OUTPUT (a1) 0,542776* 4,74830 
BOX COX (lam) 0,00500375 0,024265 
OUTPUT 2  (a11) 0,618387  1,07128 
CAPITAL-LABOUR (b12) -0,055008* -3,12451 
CAPITAL-MATERIALS (b13) -0,029219* -2,81316 
LABOUR-MATERIALS (b23) -0,048431  -1,56420 
CAPITAL 2   (b11) 0,084227* 4,41859 
LABOUR 2 (b22) 0,10344* 3,52764 
MATERIALS 2 (b33) 0,07765  2,07277 
TECHNICAL-PROGRESS 2 (d11) -0,649139  -0,520401 
OUTPUT-CAPITAL (c11) 0,120246* 2,1748 
OUTPUT-LABOUR (c12) -0,129912* -2,50505 
OUTPUT-MATERIALS (c13) 0,00966575 0,47654 
TECHNICAL-PROGRESS-OUTPUT (e11) -0,434802  -0,534498 
TECHNICAL-PROGRESS-CAPITAL (f11) -0,146528  -1,64083 
TECHNICAL-PROGRESS-LABOUR  (f12) 0,104301  1,24399 
TECHNICAL-PROGRESS-MATERIALS  0,042227  1,07297 
 Source: Internal CTT collected data; n=35;  Significance at a 5% level is indicated by * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE II: Elasticities Estimates 
Elasticities Estimate T-Statistic 
Cost of output 0,542776 4,7483 
Scale 1,84238  
 
  
